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RESPONSE TO STATE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The State incorrectly states that Gollaher touched Sarah Call "in her

private." See State's Brief at 6, 19 n.9 (stating that Sarah Call "did not recall how many
times defendant's finger was in her private . . . . " ) (emphasis added)). The State is
incorrectly and improperly attempting to state that there was evidence that Gollaher
penetrated Sarah Call's "private." In fact, there was no evidence that Gollaher ever touched
Sarah Call in her "private." Sarah Call testified only that Gollaher touched her vaginal area
which she referred to as her "private." (R. 937). The prosecutor then asked Sarah Call a
series of questions about how long and how many times Gollaher's finger was "on your
private." (R. 939). There was no evidence that Gollaher ever put his finger in her private.
2.

The State argues that the evidence was that Gollaher touched Sarah Call

on the trampoline for "about six to nine seconds." State's Brief at 6, 19. As explained
below, the evidence was that Sarah Call did not remember how long she was touched, either
on the trampoline or in the hot tub. (R. 939). She testified that she was not timing anything
(R. 998). When pressed for an estimate, she estimated the touching in the hot tub to be "a
couple of seconds." (R. 914). In three separate demonstrations, Sarah estimated the time of
the hot tub touching to be three seconds, then six seconds, and then over nine seconds,
leading her to admit that she had difficulty estimating time. (R. 799. 998). Sarah did testify
that the touching on the trampoline was longer than the touching in the hot tub, which could
have been as short as a "couple of seconds." (R. 970). At the sentencing hearing, the State
admitted that there was no evidence of a "continuing touching." (R. 1831-32).
3.

There was no evidence that Gollaher "rubbed" Sarah Call's genitals

"for several seconds." State's Brief at 4. The prosecutor asked Sarah Call how many times
1

she was rubbed, to which she answered "up and down," implying one time up and down, not
a prolonged rubbing. (R. 962).
4.

Contrary to the State's argument, Sarah Call testified that she was only

touched one time. The prosecution specifically asked Sarah Call how many times Gollaher
touched her private, to which Sarah Call admitted that "it was just the one time when [she]
woke up." (R. 939). Later, the prosecution asked Sarah Call the same question, "how many
times did he rub?", to which Sarah Call answered "up and down" (R. 962). The only way
that Sarah Call's answers can be reasonably interpreted in light of the specific questions
asked by the prosecution was that she was touched one time, up and down.
5.

There was no evidence of the "victim's credibility" presented at trial.

State's Brief at 4. To the contrary, the evidence at trial from four different witnesses
established that Sarah visited the Gollaher residence numerous times after the incident,
contradicting her statement that she tried to stay away from the Gollaher residence. (R.
1186-87, 1107, 1218, 1260-63).
ARGUMENT
I. ALL OF THE ERRORS IN THIS CASE WERE HARMFUL
This appeal must be considered in the context of the weakness of the State's
case against Gollaher. This was a one witness case. There was a total absence of any
physical proof that the offense occurred. The State's only witness, Sarah Call, was 10 years
old when the incident took place and only 13 years old when she testified. (R. 764).
Sarah did not remember how long the incident on the trampoline lasted (R.
937). By any account, the entire incident was only a matter of seconds. (See discussion
below). Sarah's testimony was inherently suspect because her initial memory of the incident
2

was, by her own voluntary statements, that it was nothing more than a dream. (R. 969,
976). When Sarah first reported the incident to her mother over six months later, she voiced
self doubt, saying that she did not know whether it really happened or whether it was a
dream. (R. 1021). According to Sarah's testimony, the brief incident on the trampoline
occurred while she was awakening from a state of sleep, thus suggesting a state of altered
mental awareness. (R. 937). Gollaher denied touching Sarah on the trampoline. (R. 1260,
1233). Sarah's credibility was in question, as four different witnesses established that Sarah
visited the Gollaher residence numerous times after the incident, belying her statement that
she tried to stay away from the Gollaher residence. (R. 1186-87, 1107, 1218, 1260-63). In
fact, the State admits that Sarah did go to Gollaher's home a number of times following the
trampoline incident. State's Brief at 36.
The State concedes that the overall evidence in this case was "limited/
State's Brief at 35. In light of the "limited" evidence, all of the errors complained of in this
appeal are prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of those
errors, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant. State v. Doporto,
935 P.2d 484, 493-94 (Utah 1997).
IL TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO INVESTIGATE AND
PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE TELEVISION PROGRAM
THAT SARAH CALL WATCHED THAT PROMPTED HER DISCLOSURE OF THE
ALLEGED ABUSE
A.

Trial Counsel Failed to Investigate and Obtain the 20/20 Transcript Despite a Specific
Request By Gollaher to Do So and Despite Knowing the Nature of the Program and
When and Where it Aired
The State does not dispute that failure to conduct a proper pretrial investigation

does not meet the objective standard of reasonableness required to provide effective
assistance of counsel. See State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). In this case,
3

on or about December 4, 1995, Gollaher wrote to his counsel specifically requesting that his
trial counsel investigate the date of the television program watched by Sarah Call and obtain
a transcript. (R. 633-34, 634). The State does not dispute that the record clearly indicates
that all the parties knew early on about the existence of the television program and that the
program had aired several days prior to February 3, 1994. See Gollaher's Opening Brief at
39 (with citation to the record). Indeed, the State itself concedes that Sarah Call's counselor
had been told by Sarah Call that the program was on 20/20. State's Brief at 40 n.22.
Trial counsel knew about the television program prior to trial. The defendant
asked trial counsel to investigate and obtain a copy of the transcript. Trial counsel knew the
general nature of the program (a news program of some sort discussing abuse of a child).
Trial counsel knew the approximate date of the program (several days prior to February 3,
1994). Trial counsel knew the market in which the program aired (Salt Lake City). The
investigation would have simply required an examination of the programs aired on the
television stations in the Salt Lake market for the period just prior to February 3, 1994.
In its opposition, the State relies solely on the self-serving affidavit of trial
counsel, given after trial in order to protect himself from a legal malpractice claim, stating
that he was not "aware of the program." (R. 678). Gollaher's trial counsel does not state
that he did not know the program existed. He does not refute Gollaher's testimony that he
was requested to find the program. He does not state that he tried to find the program. The
natural consequence of failing to investigate was that he was not aware of the specific
program.
After trial, the defendant himself conducted an investigation, located the
transcript, and delivered it to his trial counsel. (R. 633). At that point, trial counsel had

4

two options. He could have (1) admitted his ineffective assistance in failing to investigate
and locate the transcript or (2) claimed that the transcript could not have been discovered and
constituted "new evidence." Not surprisingly, trial counsel chose the second option, filing a
motion for a new trial based on the discovery of the transcript. (R. 253-306).
Gollaher fired his trial counsel and retained new counsel who substituted a
motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel in place of the motion for a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The substituted motion was based on the
clear principle of law that "'new evidence' is not evidence which was available to defendant
but not obtained by him prior to the time of trial. Nor is it evidence that he knew about or
could have discovered prior to trial." State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985)
(citations omitted). In this case, the evidence of the transcript clearly could have been
located by counsel if he had only investigated.
The fact that the defendant himself could easily locate the transcript indicates
that trial counsel could have done so prior to trial. Trial counsel simply failed to investigate
in the face of a specific request by the defendant.
B.

There is a Reasonable Probability that Evidence of the Transcript Would Have
Resulted in a Different Outcome at Trial
The State concedes the "similarities in the accounts given by Sarah C. and

Desiray Bartak" in the 20/20 program. State's Brief at 44. The State also concedes that the
opportunity for Sarah Call to receive accolades as did Desiray Bartak in the television
program constitutes a motive for Sarah Call to make the allegations of abuse in this case. kL

5

While acknowledging the similarities and the opportunity for motive, the State argues that
Gollaher "overstates the[ir] significance." IcL Significantly, the State does not claim that
Gollaher overstates the similarities.
However, at the same time, the State admits that the evidence in this case was
"limited." State's Brief at 35. As set forth above and in the opening brief, this was a one
witness case where credibility was of the utmost importance. It is undisputed that it was
Sarah Call's viewing of the 20/20 program that prompted her to make her allegations. (R.
918). Sarah Call's credibility would have certainly been negatively impacted had the jury
known that her story was so similar to the story that she just watched on television. This
conclusion was supported by Dr. Phillip Esplin, who testified at the post-trial hearing that the
close similarities between the television program and Sarah's testimony raise questions about
the potential effects of the content of the show on Sarah's report. (R. 605, 1590).
Additionally, the possible motive of Sarah Call to make allegations so that she
could receive accolades as did Desiray Bartak in the 20/20 program would have provided the
jury with additional doubts about Sarah Call's credibility.
The State's discussion of whether Gollaher would have benefited from calling
expert witnesses to testify about the television transcript is irrelevant to this appeal.
Gollaher's trial counsel stated that he had made the tactical decision not to call expert
witnesses. Gollaher has not claimed ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to this
decision. Trial counsel did not have to use expert witnesses to present the shocking
similarities between Sarah Call's testimony and the program that prompted her to make her
allegations. The reading of the transcript itself would have served the purpose of casting
doubt on Sarah Call's credibility and presenting a motive for the making of the allegations.

6

C.

The Trial Court's Denial of the Motion for New Trial Relating to the Transcript
Based on the Finding that the Trial Court Had the Information About the Television
Program Was Clearly Erroneous
The trial court denied the motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance

of counsel in locating and presenting the transcript of the 20/20 program. The trial court's
decision was based on the finding that the jury had the information regarding the T. V.
program.
It had the information about the T.V. program, and could
consider all those things, and did so, I suppose.
(R. 1816).
The State does not dispute that this is an erroneous finding. The television
transcript was not even discovered until after trial. The jury did not have this information
before it. The record is clear that the only information the jury had was that Sarah had
watched a television program that prompted her disclosure. (R. 918). The jury did not have
the evidence of the transcript of the television program, which reveals the disturbing
similarities between Sarah Call's testimony and the story of Desiray Bartak. The jury did
not have "all those things" to consider. This is a clearly erroneous ruling and must be set
aside. Templin. 805 P.2d at 186.
ffl. THE STATE COMMITTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN ITS
CLOSING ARGUMENT
A.

The Prosecutor Misstated the Evidence Regarding the Length of the Touching on the
Trampoline
The simple fact is that the evidence at trial was that Sarah Call did not

remember how long she was touched on the trampoline. Sarah Call never testified that she
was touched on the trampoline for a "prolonged" time, "six to nine seconds." On the first
day of Sarah Call's direct testimony, the prosecution asked Sarah how long she was touched
7

on the trampoline. She testified that she did not remember how long she was touched on the
trampoline. (R. 939) (Q. "How long was his finger on your private." A. "I don't
remember."). The prosecution also asked Sarah Call how long she was touched in the hot
tub. She first testified that she did not know how long she was touched in the hot tub, and
when pressed for an estimate, testified that she was touched for "a couple of seconds." (R.
914).
On the second day of direct testimony, after the prosecution had a chance to
review Sarah Call's testimony at the preliminary hearing with her, the prosecution asked
Sarah what she had testified at the preliminary hearing concerning the length of the touching
in the hot tub. Sarah testified that at the preliminary hearing, she thought the touching in the
hot tub lasted six seconds. (R. 969).
Sarah's testimony about her preliminary hearing testimony and the six second
touching was not entirely true. At the preliminary hearing, Gollaher's counsel conducted a
demonstration to see if Sarah could accurately estimate the length of the touching in the hot
tub. Gollaher's counsel said "go" when the touching started and Sarah said "now" when the
touching ended. The time period was three seconds. (R. 799). Gollaher's counsel then
repeated the demonstration again, this time resulting in an estimate of six seconds. (R. 799).
Sarah never stated which time period was accurate. Thus, Sarah's testimony at the
preliminary hearing was that the touching was three or six seconds, not six seconds. The
prosecution's distortion of this fact was also improper and may in fact constitute witness
tampering.1
*Yet another example of the State's continual misrepresentation of the facts relating to the
hot tub incident is found on page 33 of the State's Brief where the State makes states that Sarah
testified "that defendant rubbed her in the hot tub for about six to nine seconds." State's Brief
8

Sarah stated that she thought her preliminary hearing testimony was still
accurate. (R. 969). At the close of Sarah Call's direct testimony, the prosecutor asked
Sarah if the touching on the trampoline was longer or shorter than the hot tub incident and
Sarah stated "longer." (R. 970).
The State argues that on cross-examination, Gollaher's trial counsel elicited
from Sarah Call testimony that the hot tub incident lasted 9.7 seconds. State's Brief at 6 n.3.
20 n.10. This is a fallacious argument. It is clear from the record that Gollaher's counsel
was only following up on the prosecution's line of questioning on what Sarah Call's
testimony was at the preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, Gollaher's counsel
had timed Sarah's recollection of the touching in the hot tub at three seconds and then at six
seconds. (R. 799). Gollaher's counsel retimed Sarah at the trial to cast doubt on her ability
to correctly estimate time, not to establish the actual length of the touching. This was made
clear by defense counsel's question to Sarah, "Okay. And I think you told me that, or told
these folks and Mr. Cope, that at the time that you were touched it was a couple of seconds,
or was it six seconds or three seconds?" (R. 997). |
What Sarah had timed once at three seconds and then at six seconds at the
preliminary hearing, she then timed at trial at 9.7 seconds. (R. 998). Based on this timing.
Sarah Call admitted that it was hard to remember exact times and that she wasn't timing
anything. Id. The 9.7 second demonstration did not constitute testimony by Sarah of the
I
length of any touching. She stated she "wasn't timing anything." It only demonstrated her
inability to accurately estimate time.

at 33. This is absolutely not true. Sarah testified only that she was "touched" and that it could
have been accidental. See (R. 913-15).
9

Thus, Sarah Call's testimony regarding the length of touching can be
summarized as follows:
She did not know how long she was touched on the trampoline.
The touching in the hot tub lasted a "couple of seconds."
She recalled testifying at the preliminary hearing that the touching was
six seconds. (She failed to mention that she also testified at the
preliminary hearing that the touching in the hot tub was three seconds).
She thought her preliminary hearing testimony was still accurate.
The touching on the trampoline was longer than the touching in the hot
tub.
Based on her inability to time the length of hot tub incident the same at
the preliminary hearing and at trial, Sarah Call admitted that it was
hard to remember exact times and that she wasn't timing anything.
In closing argument, the prosecutor completely misstated the evidence, telling
the jury that the evidence had been that Gollaher touched Sarah Call on the trampoline for a
"prolonged," "considerable" period of time, "six to nine seconds."
"It was six to nine seconds, if you put the evidence together. The
touching was skin to skin." (R. 1316).
"She says she is awakened by his hand in her vaginal area, rubbing six
to nine seconds." (R. 1323).
"It was rubbing for a considerable period of time." (R. 1317)
(emphasis added).
"The touching that was described as prolonged." (R. 1316 (emphasis
added)).
It was inaccurate for the prosecutor to tell the jury that the touching on the
trampoline was "prolonged," "for a considerable period of time," or "six to nine seconds."
At the very most, a correct statement of the evidence would have been that Sarah Call did
not remember how long she was touched, either on the trampoline or in the hot tub. She

10

was not timing anything, but when pressed for an estimate, she estimated the touching in the
hot tub to be anywhere from "a couple of seconds" to six seconds, with the touching on the
trampoline lasting longer than the touching in the hot tub. At the sentencing hearing, the
i

State admitted that there was no evidence of a "continuing touching." (R. 970).
Even if there had been evidence that the touching did last "six to nine
seconds," it was prosecutorial misconduct to claim that the evidence showed a "rubbing" for
that entire period. There was no evidence that Gollaher "rubbed" Sarah Call's genitals for
"six to nine seconds." The prosecutor asked Sarah Call how many times she was rubbed, to
which she answered "up and down," implying one time up and down, not a prolonged
rubbing. (R. 962).
The length of the touching on the trampoline was a central issue in this case.
In the cross-examination of Scott Gollaher, the prosecution asked Gollaher whether he could
have touched Sarah Call unconsciously while he was sleeping on the trampoline. Gollaher
answered that he may have touched her unintentionally while he was sleeping. (R. 1292).
The prosecutor told the jury that the touching "could have been inadvertent" if it were a
short touching, but that a longer touching presented "pretty firm circumstantial evidence that
the person who was doing it was awake." (R. 1317).
Thus, the prosecutor needed to prove a long touching. In an attempt to prove
a long touching, the prosecutor misstated the evidence to the jury. As this court has held,
"[a] comment by a prosecutor during closing argument that the jury consider matters outside
the evidence is prosecutorial misconduct." State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339, 344 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). The State cannot in good faith argue that the misstatement was not prejudicial.
The prosecutor himself told the jury how important the length of the touching was to the

11

State's case. For misrepresenting the length of the touching, Gollaher's conviction must be
reversed.2
B.

The Prosecutor Improperly Told the Jury that Sarah Call's Testimony at Trial Was
Consistent With Her Testimony on a Videotape that Was Not Introduced Into
Evidence
It is undisputed that the prosecutor told the jury that Sarah Call's testimony

was consistent with a videotape of an interview with her conducted by certain authorities.
And she tells somebody. And those people do the right thing.
And it takes a long time before we get here, and her memory
degrades, just like everybody else's does. But there is a record,
very early on. We made a video record of this. She is
consistent.
(R. 1325) (emphasis added).
It is also undisputed that the contents of that videotape were not introduced in
evidence. (R. 1325).
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial based on this remark on the
ground that "there was nothing said about what was in the tape or anything like that." (R.
1373). In its brief, the State makes the same argument in defense of the improper reference
to the videotape, arguing that "[a]t no point were the contents of the videotape discussed."
State's Brief at 58.

2

As discussed below, it was error for the Court to allow evidence of the hot tub for the State
to attempt to establish the length of time Gollaher was alleged to have touched Sarah Call on the
trampoline six months earlier. It was also ineffective assistance of counsel for Gollaher's trial
counsel to not object to this mistake by the prosecution. As discussed below, evidence of the
hot tub incident was offered only to establish the time frame in which the allegations were made
in this case. (R. 164).
12

The trial court's finding and the State's argument are erroneous. Of course
the contents of the videotape were discussed! The prosecutor told the jury that the videotape
was consistent with Sarah Call's testimony at trial.
The prosecutor's remarks were simply an improper attempt to bolster the
credibility of the only prosecution witness. The reference to the matter not in evidence
I
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 344.
C.

The Prosecutor Improperly Remarked to the Jury that the Defendant Had Failed to
Call His Son as a Witness
The State does not dispute that it is improper to comment on the failure of the

other party to call a particular witness, unless it is shown that the witness could have
"elucidate[d] the transaction," and was "peculiarly within the adversary's power to produce."
State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Young. 463
F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). Comment by counsel as to absent witnesses is improper if
these conditions necessary for comment are lacking. Smith, 706 P.2d at 1058.
The State also does not dispute that the conditions necessary to comment on
Gollaher's failure to call his son as a witness were not satisfied.
Thus, the only question is whether the prosecutor commented on the failure of
Gollaher to call his son as a witness. The prosecutor stated as follows:
You recall their list of potential witnesses. I was extremely
gratified to know that someone named Peter, who was listed at
the beginning, was not going to be a witness.
(R. 1361).
The jury knew that Peter was Gollaher's son. See, e.g. (R. 896). The jury
knew that Peter was the only other person present during the alleged touching and the
incidents leading up to the touching. See, e.g. (R. 928). The prosecutor clearly commented
13

on the fact that Peter was not called as a witness. The inference is that Pete's testimony
would have been negative. The State argues that the prosecutor was only expressing his
relief that he did not have to cross-examine a young child. The prosecutor's personal
feelings about questioning children is irrelevant. The plain and simple fact is that he
improperly referred to the fact that the defendant did not call his son as a witness. This
improper remark was made in the final closing remarks to which the defendant had no
opportunity to respond. The reference to the "missing witness" constitutes prosecutorial
misconduct.
D.

The Prosecutor Improperly Told the Jury that the Defendant Remembered "Rubbing"
Sarah Call
The State does not dispute that the record shows that the prosecutor incorrectly

stated that the defendant remembered rubbing Sarah Call.
"Except that he remembered it was rubbing. It was rubbing for
a considerable period of time." (R. 1317 (emphasis added)).
The State's only response is to claim that the transcript contains an error.
Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide a mechanism for correction or
modification of the record on appeal "if any difference arises as to whether the record truly
discloses what occurred in the trial court." The State chose to not challenge the record on
appeal by the method provided for in the rules of procedure, and thus, the record on appeal
must stand as it exists.
The State simply assumes the record is erroneous. The State ignores the likely
possibility that the prosecutor actually said that "he" remembered it was rubbing, even if the
prosecutor did not intend to speak those words. Unfortunately, the jury cannot read the
prosecutor's mind. It can only hear the words actually spoken. The undisputed record
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establishes that the prosecutor incorrectly informed the jury that Gollaher remembered
rubbing Sarah Call.
IV. ADMISSION OF EXTENSIVE EVIDENCE OF THE SUBSEQUENT HOT TUB
INCIDENT FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT
WAS OFFERED WAS PLAIN ERROR, TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN
FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE IMPROPER ADMISSION OF THE HOT TUB
INCIDENT
Gollaher has raised as an issue in this appeal whether the trial court committed
plain error by allowing extensive evidence of an act that occurred six months after the
incident for which Gollaher was convicted. In addressing plain error, this Court must first
examine whether the "failure to raise the objections before the trial court [was] the result of a
consciously chosen strategy of trial counsel rather than an oversight, and if it was a strategic
decision, did the making of that choice constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?" State v.
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989).
As explained below, the trial court made it clear that evidence of the hot tub
incident was offered only to set the time frame in which the allegations in this case took
place. Thus, the State's position that Gollaher's trial counsel offered hot tub evidence for
some other more extensive purpose is erroneous and clearly contradicted by the defendant's
counsel and the trial court itself. Further, trial counsel's strategy in offering the bad act
evidence to set a "time frame" constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, as
set forth in Bullock, this Court may consider the issue of plain error.
A.
Trial Counsel's Strategy Was to Refer to the Hot Tub Incident Only to Set the Time
Frame in Which the Allegations Took Place
In this case, the subsequent bad act was an alleged touching of Sarah Call by
Gollaher in a hot tub on December 31, 1993, six months after the July 1993 incident for
which Gollaher was convicted. The subsequent hot tub incident was the subject of a count
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that was dismissed at the preliminary hearing on June 23, 1995, based on the fact that Sarah
Call testified that the touching could have been accidental. (R. 72, 731, 1832).
Gollaher does not dispute that his trial counsel referred to this subsequent "bad
act." However, as made clear in the defendant's proposed jury instructions, trial counsel's
strategy in referring to the subsequent hot tub incident was limited to setting "the time frame
for when the allegations were made in this case." See Defendant's Proposed Jury
Instructions (R. 140). The Court instructed the jury as follows:
You are instructed that the evidence that the defendant touched
Sarah Call in the hot tub on or about January 1, 1994, was
offered only to set the time frame for when the allegations were
made in this case. The court instructs you that you are not to
take that incident into consideration in any way in determining
the guilt of the defendant.
Instruction No. 18 (R. 164).
The State's opposition to Gollaher's appeal on the issue of the improper
admission and failure to object to the "subsequent bad act" evidence is based entirely on the
State's conjecture that Gollaher's trial counsel referred to the hot tub evidence in order to
show that "Sarah C. 'imagined' the abuse on the trampoline in the same way in which she
imagined the abuse in the hot tub." State's Brief at 13. Such a strategy does not make any
sense in light of the fact that there was no evidence that Sarah Call "imagined" the hot tub
incident. To the contrary, the evidence was that the event happened, but that it could have
been "accidental." (R. 72, 731, 1832).
In any event, the State is simply wrong about trial counsel's strategy. There is
no need to guess as to trial counsel's strategy. Defense counsel made clear his strategy when
he offered his jury instruction stating that the hot tub evidence was offered only to set the
time frame in which the allegations were made.
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B.

Trial Counsel Was Ineffective in Referring to the Hot Tub Incident to Establish "Time
Frame" Because the Hot Tub Incident Was Not Necessary to Establish Time Frame
As set forth in Bullock, if the Court determines that the failure to object was

I

the result of "strategy of trial counsel," the Court must then determine whether "the making
of that choice constitute^] ineffective assistance of counsel." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59.
If so, the Court may still consider a plain error challenge.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Gollaher must establish that
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." State v.
i

Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). The State refers to Gollaher's trial counsel as
"one of the most highly regarded criminal defense lawyers in the State" in support of its
position that trial counsel was not ineffective. State's Brief at 25. Of course, the experience
and reputation of trial counsel is completely irrelevant with regard to the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Tavlor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995) (In
determining whether counsel's performance was ineffective, the court cannot rely on
counsel's experience or whether counsel met the "prevailing norms," but must instead "look
to counsel's actual performance to determine whether it was adequate.")
In this case, trial counsel's strategy was to refer to the hot tub incident "only
to set the time frame for when the allegations were made in this case." (R. 164). The State
does not dispute Gollaher's argument that it was totally unnecessary to refer to the
subsequent bad act in the hot tub because the time frame when the allegations were made in
this case were undisputed, and in any event, the hot tub incident was not relevant to
establishing the time frame.
The crime for which Gollaher was charged was the touching of the genitals of
Sarah Call while sleeping on a trampoline on or about July 1993. (R. 149). As set forth in
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Gollaher's opening brief, it was undisputed that Sarah Call first disclosed the allegations
regarding the trampoline just prior to February 1, 1994. The State does not dispute
Gollaher's argument that evidence of the hot tub incident was not necessary to establish time
frame. Because the time frame when the allegations were made in this case was undisputed,
there was no need to introduce evidence of the hot tub incident to establish time frame. See
Doporto. 935 P.2d. at 491 (admission of prior crime evidence was error when the purpose
for which the evidence was admitted was to establish a fact that was undisputed).
Additionally, the subsequent hot tub incident was not the event that triggered
the disclosure by Sarah. Rather, the record is clear that the disclosure of both the trampoline
incident and the New Year's Eve hot tub incident were triggered by Sarah's viewing of the
20/20 television program about a girl who also claimed to have been abused. (R. 918).
Thus, it was the date of the television program that was relevant to the disclosure of the
allegations, not the hot tub incident.
The State concedes in its brief that it was wholly unnecessary to submit
evidence of the subsequent bad act to establish "time frame." See State's Brief at 29, 32
n.18. Because introduction of the bad act evidence to establish time frame was unnecessary,
trial counsel's strategy to introduce the evidence for this purpose cannot be considered to
meet the standard of reasonable representation.
C.

The Trial Court Committed Plain Error in Allowing Extensive Evidence of the
Subsequent Hot Tub Incident for Purposes Other than For the Purposes for Which it
Was Offered and By Allowing the Bad Act Evidence Without Making the Required
Findings.
Defense counsel offered evidence of the subsequent hot tub incident only to

establish the time frame for when the allegations were made in this case. The State admits in
its brief that the prosecution offered extensive evidence of the subsequent bad act for
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purposes far beyond this purpose. The prosecution offered evidence of the subsequent bad
act for the following purposes:
1.

To identify the circumstances and Sarah's perception of that abuse;

2.

To identify the circumstances in which Sarah again chose not to report
the perceived abuse;

3.

To identify the time period between the hot tub incident and Sarah's
reporting the incident to her mother;

4.

To clarify and distinguish the hot tub incident from the trampoline; and

5.

To provide a basis for assessing how long defendant touched her in the
trampoline incident.

State's Brief at 17-19.
Trial counsel's strategy did not include offering the hot tub incident for any of
the purposes for which it was offered by the State. In addition, as discussed above, trial
counsel's strategy to introduce the bad act evidence to establish time frame was itself
ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, this Court may properly consider Gollaher's
plain error challenge to the admission of the bad act evidence in this case. See Bullock. 791
P.2d at 158-59 (a threshold issue to the consideration of a plain error challenge was whether
the failure to object was chosen strategy of trial counsel and whether that strategy constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel).

|

In State v. Doporto. the Supreme Court made clear that prior to admitting
evidence of other acts, a trial court "must find" that (1) there is a necessity for the evidence,
(2) the evidence is "highly probative" of a "material issue" of the crime charged, and (3) its
special probativeness and the necessity for it outweighs its prejudicial effect. Doporto, 935
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P.2d at 490.3 The State does not dispute the fact that in this case, the trial court made no
findings whatsoever as to subsequent bad act relating to the New Year's Day hot tub
incident. The trial court's failure to make the required findings before allowing extensive
evidence of the subsequent bad act constitutes sufficient reason to reverse Gollaher's
conviction.
Additionally, even if the trial court had made the necessary findings to allow
the admission of the bad act evidence to establish time frame, the trial court erred by
allowing the State to repeatedly refer to the incident for purposes other than to establish time
frame.4 As discussed above, the most egregious example of the State's improper use of the
subsequent bad act evidence was to attempt to establish the length of the alleged touching on
the trampoline by reference to the length of the touching in the subsequent hot tub incident.
(R. 1316-17, 1323). It was plain error for the trial court to allow the State to present the
bad act evidence for the purposes for which it was used by the State.

3

The State argues, without any legal basis, that the requirement in Doporto that the Court
make findings prior to allowing evidence of prior bad acts does not apply in this case because
trial counsel did not object to the introduction of the evidence. State's Brief at 30-31 n.17.
Doporto contains no such limitation. Rather, in Doporto the Supreme Court made clear that the
bad act evidence is always presumed to be inadmissible and that the trial court must make
required findings before admitting the bad act evidence. In this case, the trial court indicated
that the bad act evidence was offered only to establish time frame. However, the trial court
made no findings as to the "necessity" or the "probativeness" of the evidence for this purpose
or for any other purpose before allowing its admission.
4

The State argues that it needed to continually refer to the hot tub incident to "keep Sarah
on track to discuss the trampoline incident." State's Brief at 18 n.8. This statement is
disingenuous in light of the fact that there was no indication that Sarah had any trouble keeping
focused on the issue of the trampoline incident and given the fact that the State admits that it
intentionally focused on the hot tub incident for various reasons, including to prove the length
of the touching on the trampoline. See State's Brief at 17-18.
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D.

Trial Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Object to the Improper Use of the Bad Act
Evidence
Trial counsel's strategy was to refer to the hot tub incident only to establish

time frame for when the allegations were made in this case. As discussed above, this
strategy itself constituted ineffective assistance of counsel as the time frame when the
allegations were made was undisputed. Trial counsel was further ineffective in failing to
object to the introduction of the bad act evidence by the State for purposes other than to
establish time frame. The State refuses to discuss the prejudice prong with regard to
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the bad act evidence based on the
assumption that trial counsel's decision to not object was a part of trial strategy. See State's
Brief at 26 n.13. However, as explained above, it is clear that the trial strategy was limited
to offering the hot tub evidence only to establish the time frame when the allegations were
made. Consequently, it was error for trial counsel to not object to the more extensive use of
the hot tub evidence by the State, as the State went far beyond the trial counsel's intended
strategy.
E.

Admission of the Bad Act Evidence Was Harmful and Was Not Cured by the
Limiting Instruction
As discussed at the outset, because of the weakness of the State's case against

Gollaher, all of the errors complained of by Gollaher were harmful. In the case of the bad
act evidence that was improperly admitted, there is a "reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction." State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293,
1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The harmfulness in this case was exacerbated by the repeated
reference to the bad act evidence by the prosecution, who made the hot tub incident the focal
point of its case. In fact, a review of the transcript of the trial reveals that there was far
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more discussion about the hot tub incident than about the trampoline incident for which
Gollaher was convicted.
This type of bad act evidence is specifically prohibited because such evidence
presents "dangers to the fairness and integrity of a trial . . ., including [t]he over-strong
tendency to believe the accused guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person to
do such acts," and "the tendency to condemn not because the accused is believed guilty of
the present charge but because he has escaped unpunished from other offenses." Doporto.
935 P.2d at 490-91.
Having made the hot tub incident a focal point of its case, the State cannot
possibly meet its burden of "demonstrating that the improperly elicited testimony was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1296. The State argues that
the limiting instruction cured the plain error. However, as explained in Gollaher's opening
brief, it is well accepted that limiting instructions cannot "undo serious prejudice." State v.
Peters. 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). See also Bruton v. United States. 391
U.S. 123, 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1628 (1968) (holding that clear instructions to the jury to
disregard inadmissible hearsay evidence inculpating the defendant was not sufficient to cure
the error); Krulewitch v. United States. 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 S.Ct. 716, 723 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."). At most, a
limiting instruction may "reduce somewhat" the prejudice suffered by the defendant. Peters,
796 P.2d at 712.
The admission of the bad act evidence constituted harmful plain error.
Likewise the ineffective assistance of counsel was prejudicial.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as the reasons set forth in the opening brief,
the conviction of Scott Logan Gollaher should be reversed.
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